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Abstract
Default rates on instalment loans vary with type of the good pur-
chased. This variation persists even after controlling for contract and
consumer-speci¯c characteristics. Using an Italian dataset of instal-
ment loans between 1995-1999, we explore whether such variation is
due to unobserved heterogeneity and selection (adverse selection) or
due to the e®ect of the speci¯c features of the good (moral hazard). We
exploit the data on multiple contracts per individual to disentangle the
two e®ects, and ¯nd that most of the variation is explained by selection.
Individuals who buy motorcycles on credit are more likely to default
on any loan, while those buying kitchen appliances and furniture units
are more likely to repay, compared to average.
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port.1 Introduction
Why should loan to buy a fridge be repaid with a higher probability than
loan to buy a motorcycle? It has been observed that similar instalment loans
which ¯nance purchases of di®erent types of goods di®er in the incidence of
default. Table 1, which summarizes the repayment behavior on borrowers'
¯rst contracts with Findomestic Banca, a leading Italian bank, over the
period 1995-1999, shows there is considerable variation among the default
rates of loans ¯nancing di®erent goods. Mobile phones, motorcycles and
used cars are repaid least often, while furniture, kitchen appliances and new
cars are at the other end of the repayment spectrum. The observed default
rates range from 10 % to 2 %. We ¯rst show that the di®erences persist
even after controlling for numerous contract-speci¯c and consumer-speci¯c
factors, as well as for the potential selection bias due to the fact that default
is observed only for those loan applications that have been accepted.
The remaining variation in default rates across goods, conditional on
the observable borrower and contract characteristics and on the acceptance
decision, may be explained by two di®erent mechanisms, the selection e®ect
and the good e®ect. The selection e®ect suggests that people who are more
prone to defaulting are more likely to buy on credit certain goods such as
motorcycles or mobile phones rather than other goods, while people who
typically repay their loans are more likely to buy other types of goods on
credit. The resulting variation in the default probability is then due to the
unobserved individual heterogeneity and the selection of individuals with
di®erent repayment behavior to di®erent types of goods. The variation in
the default rates across di®erent goods' categories then simply re°ects the
variation in the average level of repayment behavior among people buying
speci¯c type of goods on credit.1
On the other hand, the good e®ect may be present even when individuals
are homogenous in their default inclinations, and suggests that it is the
speci¯c features of the good that a®ect the incentives to repay, such as high
depreciation rate or low penalty for defaulting.
The aim of this paper is to bring evidence on which of the two mecha-
nisms, whether the selection or the good e®ect, stand behind the observed
variation in the default rates, and if both (which is not unlikely), which of the
two dominates. Is it the speci¯c features of the good, or rather the speci¯c
1 The present analysis considers only credit ¯nanced purchases of the goods. Con-
sumer's choice whether to buy a good on credit or not, and which types of goods to buy
on credit, is highly relevant but disregarded here due to data limitations. We discuss the
potential implications of this omission on our results later.
1Table 1: Default Rates per Good - Ranked in Descending Order
Good Default Rate No. of Contracts
Telecommunication 10.03% 14,090
Motorbikes 6.58% 9,841
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes 6.53% 2,357
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) 6.09% 26,376
Other 4.81% 8,131
Computers 3.98% 3,062
Furniture Units 3.75% 4,504
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) 3.70% 5,454
New Cars and Motor Homes 2.10% 4,434
Source: Data described in Section 3, ¯rst observed contracts only.
features of the individuals who buy the good, what explains the observed dif-
ferences in the default rates? E.g., is it the case that people who often don't
repay their debts buy motorcycles on credit more often, or is it something
about the motorcycles which makes their owners to not repay? Phrased in
the standard microeconometric terminology: is it the good-speci¯c causal
e®ect that drives the variation in the default rates across di®erent types of
goods, or the selection e®ect related to the individual heterogeneity in the
default behavior? Using terminology from the asymmetric information lit-
erature: is it the contract(good)-speci¯c e®ect (moral hazard), or the fact
that individuals with di®erent default inclinations sort themselves to buy on
credit di®erent goods (adverse selection)? The present paper's objectives is
to disentangle the two mechanisms, without giving them an explicit inter-
pretation as to how they work. However, we do summarize our conjectures
about the two mechanisms in this introduction and will invoke them again
when interpreting our results.
Certain types of products, such as motorcycles, may be preferred by
risk-loving individuals (e.g. young, single, renters in terms of the observed
characteristics), who also tend to repay their loans less often on average.
Other types of goods, such as household equipment, are likely to be pur-
chased by more risk-averse individuals, those who have or are about to start
a family, who are home owners etc. and who tend to repay their debts,
compared to the average. The risk-association of particular types of goods
and the positive correlation between risk aversion and repayment behavior
may establish the observed patterns, as caused purely by the selection e®ect.
As for the good e®ect, two types of a good's characteristics may have
impact on the repayment incentives. The ¯rst is related to the extent and
2duration of the utility the good brings to the consumer, as re°ected by
the rate with which the good depreciates. This may be given either by
technical features of the good (its lifetime and how easily it breaks down),
or to changes in preferences (especially in the case of goods that are highly
subject to fashion). High depreciation rate and therefore high turnover of
the good - if it easily breaks down or quickly becomes old-fashioned - is
likely to reduce the incentives to repay. The second feature is related to the
cost of default, namely the probability of punishment, i.e. the likelihood
that the good, if not repaid, will be repossessed by the lender. The size
and mobility of the good have e®ect on whether it can be repossessed easily,
and the existence and e±ciency of a second-hand market for that particular
good a®ect the incentives of the lender to repossess it or not. New car is
an example of the good that can be easily identi¯ed (due to compulsory car
registration) and repossessed, and at the same time is worth repossessing,
as it can be immediately sold on a used-car market.
There is both theoretical and empirical research on the optimal repay-
ment decision. Papers like Wang and White (2000) study the decision to
¯le for a bankruptcy, other papers consider the decision to default on a
particular loan. However, to our knowledge, none of these works link the
decision to default on an instalment loan to the kind of the good that has
been ¯nanced by that loan. There are a few exceptions that mention the
features of the good or its market as important. Iossa and Palumbo (2003,
2004) suggest that a default on the instalment loan when the product is de-
fective establishes incentives for ¯nance institutions to share product-failure
responsibility. The authors show that such lender liability in consumer credit
transactions helps to prevent market failure due to informational asymmetry
between sellers and buyers about the product's quality.
We use an administrative dataset of instalment loan contracts of a lead-
ing Italian bank (Findomestic Banca) between 1995 and 1999 to estimate
a model of the default probability. Multiple contracts per individual are
observed, which allows us to disentangle the selection e®ect from the good
e®ect. We use information about rejected applications to control for the
potential bias due to the fact that default is observed only for those loan
applications that have been accepted.
We ¯nd that most of the residual variation in default rates across the
di®erent goods, after controlling for the observable borrower and contract
characteristics and for the acceptance decision, is due to individual hetero-
geneity and selection. Our results suggest that individuals who buy motor-
cycles are more likely than an average person to default on any type of loan.
On the other hand, individuals who buy kitchen appliances and furniture
3units are less likely to default on their loans compared to the average. New
cars and mobile phones are two types of goods where the good e®ect seems
to matter as well, reducing the repayment probability in the earlier case and
increasing it in the latter. Given that the contract terms vary only with the
goods but not with individuals, the results show that there exists a cross-
subsidy from the repaying individuals, when they buy a good that has a
high average default rate, towards those who don't repay. We conclude that
conditions of the loan should not depend only on the type of the good being
purchased but also on the good-related type of the individual who applies
for the loan. It also follows that previous loan applications may be used
by credit-granting companies as an additional piece of information about
the propensity to default even without or prior to observing the repayment
behavior on the ¯rst loan.
The paper is organized as follows. The introduction is followed by a
section that de¯nes the speci¯cation of the problem and a section that de-
scribes the data. Econometric methodology is presented in the section that
follows. Next comes the descriptive statistics and an overview of our main
results. Finally, we discuss the sensitivity of our results and conclude. The
Appendix contains de¯nition of the key variables, full estimation results,
and the results of the sensitivity analysis.
2 Speci¯cation of the Problem
An individual applies for an instalment loan to purchase a certain good and
his application is accepted. His repayment behavior is assumed to follow
Equation 1. D¤
ijg represents the unobserved propensity of an individual i to
default on contract type j ¯nancing a purchase of the good g.
D¤
ijg = Xi¯ + Zj° + ±g + ¹i + "ij (1)
Dijg = (D¤
ijg > 0) is an indicator whether an individual i defaulted on a
contract j ¯nancing good g
Xi is vector of individual-speci¯c characteristics (such as disposable income,
employment status, job tenure, home ownership, demographic charac-
teristics etc.)
Zj is vector of contract-speci¯c characteristics2 (such as length of the con-
tract, size of the loan, interest rate, price of the good etc.)
2 Similar to our data, contract characteristics are not person speci¯c.The terms of the
contract are posted next to the good to be purchased.
4±g is an indicator of the good g being purchased (goods' ¯xed e®ects)3
¹i is unobservable individual-speci¯c heterogeneity (individual ¯xed
or random e®ects)
"ij is iid error term assumed to be independent of all the RHS variables
There are I individuals, up to J contracts, and up to G types of goods. An
observational unit is a \person-contract". Should all individuals have the
same number of contracts J, the sample size would be I ¤ J.
When only one contract is observed per person, the sample consists of
I observations. Including a dummy variable for each type of good (±g)
reveals some information about the size and signi¯cance of the \reduced
form" e®ects of di®erent types of the goods on the probability of default. It
also shows whether the variation in the default probability across di®erent
types of the goods persists even when conditioning on the contract-speci¯c
and individual-speci¯c characteristics.
If there is no unobservable individual heterogeneity (¹i) in the default
behavior, or if this heterogeneity is distributed randomly across the goods
that the individuals buy and ¯nance through credit (namely E(¹i=g) =
E(¹i) and ¹i is independent of the RHS variables), the estimated good-
speci¯c coe±cients can be interpreted as the \structural" causal good e®ects,
i.e. an e®ect a particular good has on the individuals' repayment behavior.
If this is not the case ( E(¹i=g) 6= E(¹i)), it means that individuals
with di®erent unobservable default propensity buy di®erent types of goods.
This could fully explain the remaining variation in the default probability
across di®erent goods as captured by the estimated good-speci¯c dummy
variables. The dataset with one contract per person doesn't allow to control
for ¹i directly. One possibility is to correct for the good-speci¯c selection bias
by estimating a multinomial model of the choice of the good to be bought
on credit, together with the equation for the default probability (Equation
1). However, this approach rests on strong distributional assumptions and
requires exclusion restrictions that are often hard to ¯nd.
Observing multiple contracts per individual allows to control for indi-
vidual heterogeneity in an easier way, as multiple contract data helps the
estimation in a similar way as panel data do compared to a cross-section
(multiple ij observations allow to control for the individual speci¯c hetero-
geneity ¹i). However, attrition is endogenous here, and the extent of the
bias is substantial. In particular, even if people who default on their ¯rst
3 There is no contract ¯xed e®ect, as all other contract related terms are observed.
5contract were still to decide to apply for another contract (which is unlikely),
the probability that the application will be accepted and the repayment be-
havior for that contract will be observed is close to zero. It is far from
obvious how to model the selection process behind this kind of data, where
the current behavior determines whether a subsequent contract is observed.4
This paper attempts to combine the two alternatives, while avoiding their
shortcomings: as will be explained later, we estimate the default probabil-
ity on only borrowers' accepted ¯rst contracts, while using the information
about the goods ¯nanced by the subsequent accepted or rejected applica-
tions to capture the good-related individual heterogeneity.
3 Data
The data used in this paper comprises both accepted and rejected loan appli-
cations for instalment credit with Findomestic Banca, a major Italian bank
which specializes in ¯nancing consumer durable goods. The dataset is a
cross-sectional snapshot of contracts, containing contract features, borrower
characteristics, as well as indicators of repayment behavior for the accepted
contracts. The loans are not collateralized but if they are not repaid, con-
tracts are sold to third parties (collecting agencies). Each borrower may
have several contracts. All current and past contracts and applications up
to 1999 (the year of extraction of the data) of a borrower are observed. The
sampling has been performed randomly on a borrower level. The observed
contracts and applications span over the period 1995-1999.
As the data includes multiple contracts and applications per individual,
we could in principle use the panel data structure to control for the unob-
served individual speci¯c heterogeneity. However, as mentioned previously,
endogenous attrition is likely to bias substantially the results. Although
modeling the process of the subsequent applications conditional on the pre-
vious contracts' performance, is in principle possible, the insu±cient infor-
mation about the timing of the default in the data prevents us from being
able to determine exactly what information is known to the bank about the
preceding contracts (and their repayment outcomes) when the acceptance
decision on the current contract is made. For these reasons, we propose
and use an alternative solution to controlling for the unobserved goods-type
individual heterogeneity.
4 The set-up is similar to dynamic panel data models with endogenous attrition.
64 Econometric Methods
This section describes the three empirical models we estimate. So far, in
Table 1 we have only presented the unconditional variation in the default
probabilities across the di®erent goods. The ¯rst question that we need
to answer is whether the variation is still present after controlling for the
observable individual and contract speci¯c characteristics.
4.1 Model I
We therefore ¯rst estimate a simple model of the default probability as a
function of the goods' indicators, also including the features of the contract
and the individual characteristics of the borrowers, using a simple probit
model. The signi¯cance of the goods' indicators (good-speci¯c dummy vari-
ables) show whether the observed variation persists even when conditioning
on these other factors. We call this simple binary model of the default prob-
ability Model I, and estimate it using the accepted ¯rst contracts only to
avoid the endogenous attrition bias in the composition of the subsequent
contracts.
4.2 Model II
Even in the absence of unobserved individual heterogeneity, estimation of
Model I is subject to a selection bias due to censoring, as not all ¯rst ap-
plications are accepted and there may be a systematic di®erence between
the repayment behavior on contracts that were accepted, compared to the
repayment behavior on the rejected contracts had they been accepted, which
may distort the estimation results.
In addition, acceptance rates also vary across di®erent types of goods (see
Table 2) which may further bias the estimated goods' indicators. We take
this potential selection into account in Model II. The default probability is
estimated on the subset of the accepted ¯rst applications, while the rejected
¯rst applications are used to correct for the selection bias due to the fact
that the repayment behavior is only observed for people (contracts) who's
¯rst applications were successful, i.e. who were actually granted the credit.
We use a bivariate probit model with the default probability equation and
the acceptance decision equation to take into account the censoring of the
contracts for which repayment behavior is observed. The model is estimated
jointly by maximum likelihood. The identi¯cation of this model requires at
least one exclusion restriction, a variable present in the selection equation
7Table 2: Acceptance Rates per Good
Good % Accepted No. of Contracts
(Used) Cars and motor homes 64.6% 3,693
Motorbikes 75.1% 13,224
Telecommunication 78.1% 18,057
New Cars and motor homes 78.8% 5,709
Other 80.3% 10,162
Electr. equipment (Brown Goods) 83.2% 31,774
Computers 86.6% 3,545
Furniture Units 86.8% 5,215
White Goods (kitchen appliances) 88.5% 6,165
but excluded from the equation of the default probability.
We follow Alessie et al. (2005) when choosing the exclusion restriction.
The advantage of the data at hand is that it spans over a period during
which a reform was enacted in Italy, which put ceilings on the interest rates
on certain consumer loans. It is likely that such a policy measure had an
impact on the degree of credit rationing for the consumer loans that were
a®ected by the reform. The exclusion restriction, which allows us to control
for potentially endogenous credit rationing, is therefore a dummy variable
that indicates whether the contract started before this so-called Usury Law
reform came into e®ect (the beginning of 1997) or after. As the law a®ected
the top interest rates, it is likely that it had also an impact on the acceptance
rates (extent of credit rationing) of the loans with high interest rates. As
will be shown in the section presenting our results, the coe±cient from the
selection equation suggests that this is indeed the case: the dummy variable
that indicates that the contract (the application) originates from the period
prior to the reform suggests that, controlling for any other factors (including
the year dummy variables for the start of the contract), the acceptance rates
fell after the reform. This outcome is consistent with the idea that a credit
company in response to the reform, tries to maintain its expected return
from credit (given the default probabilities) constant, i.e. making the rules
stricter when some of the interest rates had to be lowered below the legal
limit.
Similarly to Alessie et al. (2005), we assume that the Usury Law directly
a®ected only the supply side of the market. The validity of the exclusion
restriction hinges also on the assumption that any e®ect of the law on the
individuals' default behavior is channeled solely through the interest rate,
8and through the change in the pool of the accepted applications, two factors
that are both controlled for in the model.
We estimate Model II to ¯nd out whether the observed variation in the
default rates across di®erent types of the goods persists, even when the
potential selection bias due to the fact that default is observed only for the
accepted applications, is taken into account. The statistical signi¯cance of
the goods' indicators reveals whether this is still the case.
If the variation in the default probabilities across the di®erent goods is
still present, we can ask the key question of this analysis: what drives this
(remaining) variation? Is it the selection e®ect, due to di®erent individual
types buying di®erent goods, or is it the causal e®ect of the good itself?
Neither Model I or Model II can answer this question.
4.3 Model III - Preferred Model
In addition to the previous models, the preferred model makes use of the
information from the subsequent applications to construct the individual
goods-type indicators to control for the fact that individuals with di®erent
unobserved default risk possibly may sort themselves to di®erent types of
goods. However, to avoid endogenous attrition and the complex selection
mechanisms, Equation 1 is still estimated on the ¯rst contracts only. The
preferred speci¯cation uses rejected ¯rst applications as in Model II, to take
into account the selection due to censoring.
To proxy the unobserved goods-type individual heterogeneity, we con-
struct an individual-speci¯c goods-type indicators M
g
i as follows: M
g
i equals
one if among all the observed applications (including accepted and the re-
jected applications, ¯rst as well as subsequent) of individual i for instalment
loans from the bank is at least one that applies for ¯nancing good g, and it
equals zero otherwise.
As there are G types of goods observed, there are G indicators of this
kind constructed and included in Equation 1 to capture the part of ¹i that
is correlated with the type of the good. In other words, the above described
method controls for any goods-related unobserved time-invariant individual
heterogeneity ¹
g
i through a certain kind of constructed ¯xed e®ects. It
does however capture only the good-speci¯c individual heterogeneity, and
it still makes an assumption about the remaining unobserved individual
heterogeneity to be randomly distributed across the contracts and goods.
The above mentioned indicators M
g
i , constructed from all instalment
loan applications an individual ¯led at the bank during the given period,
serve to control for the unobserved individual goods-type heterogeneity in
9the default risk. As there are nine types of goods, there are nine variables in
the model each of which indicate whether an individual i ever (during the
observed period) applied (at least once) for credit for that particular type
of good.
With these indicators at hand, the following model is estimated:
D¤
ijg = Xi¯ + Zj° + ±g + M
g
i + "ij
Y ¤
ij = Wb + uij
Dij = 1(D¤
ij > 0)
Yij = 1(y¤
ij > 0)
Dij is observed i® Yij = 1
where the naming convention is as before, Yij indicates whether the appli-
cation was accepted or not (selection equation), and W includes all Xs and
Zs that are observed at the time of the acceptance decision about the loan
application, and at least one more variable, an exclusion restriction which
is the Usury Law dummy variable as described in Model II.
The error terms "ij and uij are assumed to be jointly normally distributed.
4.4 Overview of the Estimated Models
The three estimated models and their respective assumptions and features
are therefore as follows.
Model I: Simple probit model of the default probability; estimated on the
accepted ¯rst applications (contracts); controls for observed contract
and individual speci¯c characteristics; ignores selection due to censor-
ing; ignores possible goods-related individual heterogeneity
Model II: Bivariate probit Model with one equation for the default prob-
ability and the other for the acceptance decision; estimated on all ¯rst
applications; controls for selection due to censoring via credit rationing
(using rejected applications); ignores possible goods-related individual
heterogeneity
Model III: Preferred model - bivariate probit Model which includes the
individual goods-type indicators constructed on the bases of all ob-
served applications per individual; estimated on all ¯rst applications;
controls for selection due to censoring (using rejected applications);
10controls for possible goods-related individual heterogeneity using the
additional information from multiple contracts
5 Descriptive Statistics
There are 75,458 accepted ¯rst loan applications and 16,020 rejected ¯rst
applications in the data used for the estimation. The overall number of ap-
plications used to construct the individual goods-type indicators is 129,704.
Most of the individuals (62,156) in the sample have applied for only one
type of the goods. There are 11,379 individuals who applied for two types
of goods, 1,697 individuals who applied for three types, 207 who applied for
four types, and 19 individuals who applied for ¯ve types of goods during the
given period.
6 Results
The simple tabulation as shown in Table 1, without conditioning on any
other factors, suggests that mobile phones, motorcycles, used cars and elec-
trical appliances (brown goods) have the highest default rates, while furni-
ture units, kitchen goods and especially new cars have the lowest default
rates.
We next present the results from the estimation of the three models
described above. We distinguish 9 categories of goods in our sample and
choose the residual category titled \Other" as the base category.5 The e®ect
of the good on the probability of the default is therefore always relative to
the category Other.
Only the goods' indicators (dummy variables whether the good X was
¯nanced with the loan) and, for the preferred model, also the coe±cients
of the goods-type individual speci¯c heterogeneity GI(X), where X is the
number of the good category, are presented here. The impact of the di®erent
types of goods and the good-speci¯c individual heterogeneity are expressed
in terms of marginal e®ects. The list of the other right hand side vari-
ables that we condition on and the full estimation results can be found in
Appendix.
Once we condition on the key individual-speci¯c and contract-speci¯c
factors by a probit, the variation of the default rates across the di®erent
5The reason is that it is a mixture of various unclassi¯ed goods and it is ranked in the
middle according to the unconditional default rates across the good categories, and should
more or less represent the average.
11Table 3: Model I
Variable Marg. E®. (Std. Err.)
New Cars and Motor Homes -0.021¤¤ (0.003)
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes 0.001 (0.005)
Motorbikes 0.008¤¤ (0.003)
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) 0.013¤¤ (0.003)
Computers 0.000 (0.004)
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) 0.001 (0.003)
Furniture Units -0.008¤¤ (0.003)
Telecommunication 0.033¤¤ (0.004)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other is the Base Category.
goods is re°ected by the signi¯cance of the marginal e®ects of the goods on
the default probability, i.e. whether they are statistically signi¯cant from
the base category a therefore also from each other. Table 3, which presents
estimation results from Model I, shows that only ¯ve categories of goods
are signi¯cantly di®erent from the base category: Mobile phones, electrical
equipment and motorcycles are repaid less often than average, while new
cars and furniture units are repaid more often than average. When we com-
pare the unconditional ranking of the default rates from Table 1 with the
ranking of the marginal e®ects estimated in Model I in Table 3, we see that
the ranking of the goods according to the default probability is more or less
preserved, but kitchen appliances are ranked at a higher and used cars at
a lower level than before, suggesting that selection on observable charac-
teristics of the contracts and the borrowers drives part of the very low and
very high unconditional default rates in these two cases. The results from
Model I reveal that the variation in the default rates across the di®erent
good categories is present even when conditioning on the contract and in-
dividual characteristics. The estimates con¯rm the positive e®ect of mobile
phones (0.033), electrical equipment (0.013), and motorcycles (0.008), and
the negative e®ect of furniture units (-0.008) and new cars (-0.021) on the
default probability.
In Model II, when we control for the selection due to censoring, i.e. the
fact that repayment behavior is only observed for the accepted applications,
the results do not qualitatively change. Table 4 shows that not only signi¯-
cance but even the magnitudes of the marginal e®ects estimated by Model
12Table 4: Model II
Variable Marg. E®. (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
New Cars and Motor Homes -0.018¤¤ (0.003)
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes 0.003 (0.005)
Motorbikes 0.007¤¤ (0.003)
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) 0.012¤¤ (0.003)
Computers 0.000 (0.004)
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) 0.000 (0.003)
Furniture Units -0.007¤¤ (0.003)
Telecommunication 0.029¤¤ (0.004)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other is the Base Category.
I and Model II are fairly similar. Although selection matters for the esti-
mation, and the correlation between the error terms of the default and the
selection equations is found positive and signi¯cant (see full results of Model
II in the Appendix), most of the goods' coe±cients are a®ected only little
compared to results from Model I: controlling for selection seems to reduce
the magnitude (in absolute value) of some of the marginal e®ects, but the
changes are minor. To summarize, the results from Model II reveal that the
variation in default rates across di®erent goods is still present, even after
controlling for the censoring.
We next estimate Model III to ¯nd out whether it is the selection or
the good e®ect which explains this remaining variation. Model III controls
for the unobserved individual-speci¯c heterogeneity due to sorting of people
with di®erent default risk to di®erent types of goods via the constructed
individual goods-type indicator. Table 5, which summarizes the results,
reveals that the e®ect of the goods themselves on the default rate disappears
for furniture units and is diminished for the electrical equipment, while it
changes the sign for the motorcycles. The negative e®ect of new cars and
the positive e®ect of mobile phones remains signi¯cant and substantial, but
reduces by one third for the latter. The good e®ect of the mobile phones
seems intuitive: they are probably easy to \hide" - not easy to repossess
by the debt-collector, are often stolen, broken, or get quickly out of fashion
etc., features that all lower their lifetime or increases their depreciation rate,
and therefore possibly reduce the incentives of the borrowers to repay them.
13The positive e®ect of the new cars may be harder to interpret. However,
both relatively easy repossession and a well-developed and e±cient second-
hand market for the used cars may increase the threat of the punishment
(repossession) and increase the probability of repaying in this case.
The results further reveal, that the previously documented negative ef-
fect of the furniture units and, to some extent, electrical equipment, are due
to selection: it is not the e®ect of the two types of goods but rather the
people who buy them that reduces the default probability. The marginal ef-
fects of the goods-type individual heterogeneity shows that selection among
di®erent types of goods is substantial and relevant for the observed varia-
tion in the default rates: Individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture
units, but also computers and electrical equipment (and the \Other" cate-
gory goods) are less likely to default, while those who buy motorcycles have
a higher probability of default (although only at a 10 % signi¯cance level).
In case of the motorcycles, it seems that both a selection (increasing the
default probability) and a good e®ect (reducing the default probability) are
at work: while not-repaying people seem to buy motorcycles more often,
the good has a positive e®ect on repayment. A similar argument (the two
counteracting e®ects although with opposite signs) holds also for the elec-
trical equipment: while repaying people buy electrical equipment, electrical
equipment makes individuals repay less often.
The results of the selection e®ect seem to be consistent with the common
sense. It is predominantly young, single, risk-loving individuals, who possi-
bly don't have much property or reputation at risk, and don't bare too many
responsibilities, who buy motorcycles and who may also be more prone to
default. Individuals who buy kitchen appliances or furniture units on the
other hand probably have (or are about to start) a family, are home-owners,
and lead a more steady life. As default may be too costly for them, they
tend to repay their debts more when compared to the average.
To summarize, much of the across-good variation in the default prob-
ability can be explained by selection rather than the e®ect of the good.
Individuals who buy kitchen appliances, furniture units, and computers are
less likely to default their loans than the average person. The pure \causal"
goods' e®ect remains only for the mobile phones and new cars, the ¯rst posi-
tive while the other negative. For motorcycles and the electrical equipment,
both e®ects seem to be at play, although good e®ect is more important for
the former and selection for the latter.
14Table 5: Model III - Preferred Model
Variable Marg. E®. (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
New Cars and Motor Homes (1) -0.022¤¤ (0.004)
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes (2) -0.006 (0.006)
Motorbikes (3) -0.009¤ (0.004)
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) (4) 0.009y (0.005)
Computers (5) 0.002 (0.008)
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) (6) 0.008 (0.007)
Furniture Units (7) -0.004 (0.006)
Telecommunication (8) 0.018¤¤ (0.006)
GI(1) 0.002 (0.005)
GI(2) 0.001 (0.005)
GI(3) 0.008y (0.004)
GI(4) -0.007¤¤ (0.002)
GI(5) -0.009¤ (0.004)
GI(6) -0.013¤¤ (0.003)
GI(7) -0.011¤¤ (0.004)
GI(8) -0.001 (0.003)
GI(9) -0.008¤¤ (0.003)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other (9) is the Base Category.
157 Sensitivity Analysis
As the coe±cients of the individual goods-type indicators are identi¯ed o®
the individuals who are observed to apply for credit for more than one type
of good, to check the robustness of our results, we estimate Model III only
using the accepted ¯rst contracts of individuals who have applications for
loans for more than one type of goods in the data. However, we use all
¯rst rejected applications to control for the selection. The sample size thus
reduces to 13,302 accepted ¯rst applications and (again) 16,020 rejected ¯rst
applications.
The estimates, presented in Table 6, underline even more the conclusion
that all the observed variation in the default rates across the goods is due
to selection, i.e. sorting of individuals to di®erent types of goods. The
only good e®ect left is that of new cars, but the coe±cient is signi¯cantly
di®erent from the base category only at the 10 % level. The positive good
e®ect of the mobile phones, the positive e®ect of electrical equipment and
the negative e®ect of motorcycles on the default probability disappear when
only multiple good-types applications are used for the estimation.
In addition, when we focus only on multiple good-types applications,
the observed variation in the default rates across goods due to selection is
more or less reduced to only three good categories, and these are kitchen
appliances, furniture units, and motorcycles. Though only the ¯rst has a
highly signi¯cant marginal e®ect, while the latter two are signi¯cant only
at the 10 % signi¯cance level. As mentioned above, in both cases it is the
sorting of individuals to buying the di®erent goods on credit, which drives
the above-average default probability on the loans for motorcycles, and the
bellow-average probability on the loans for kitchen appliances and furniture
units.
Compared to the results from the preferred model, the sensitivity anal-
ysis with multiple good-types applications changes the signi¯cance of some
of the e®ects but preserves their signs - with the only exception: the good
e®ect of the motorcycles, which was negative signi¯cant, becomes positive
but insigni¯cant, while the magnitude of the e®ect of individual heterogene-
ity of individuals buying motorcycles increases. As pointed out above, it
suggests that the selection e®ect for the motorcycles dominates the good
e®ect, if there is any.
The present analysis su®ers from an important limitation which however
cannot be dealt with, with the present data. First, the approach followed
in this paper considers only consumer behavior, while taking the creditors'
behavior as given. The full equilibrium approach would be preferable but the
16Table 6: Sensitivity Results - Multiple GI Information Only
Variable Marg. E®. (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
New Cars and Motor Homes (1) -0.033y (0.017)
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes (2) -0.014 (0.016)
Motorbikes (3) 0.003 (0.012)
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) (4) 0.012 (0.011)
Computers (5) -0.012 (0.014)
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) (6) 0.000 (0.012)
Furniture Units (7) -0.002 (0.013)
Telecommunication (8) 0.021 (0.014)
GI(1) 0.004 (0.009)
GI(2) 0.002 (0.009)
GI(3) 0.014y (0.008)
GI(4) -0.007 (0.007)
GI(5) -0.012 (0.009)
GI(6) -0.021¤¤ (0.008)
GI(7) -0.015y (0.008)
GI(8) -0.004 (0.006)
GI(9) -0.011 (0.007)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other (9) is the Base Category.
lack of data restricts us only to a partial-equilibrium focus here. Second,
the estimation focuses only on individuals who buy the various goods on
credit.6 Neither the decision to buy on credit, nor the choice of which of
the goods should be ¯nanced through credit and which paid on the spot, is
modeled or estimated here. Both choices may be in principle endogenous
to the repayment behavior, which may bias our results. Given the data at
hand, we are compelled to assume that these choices are both orthogonal to
the default propensity.
There is however a third potential problem, which is the endogenous
attrition. Individuals that tend to repay their debts are more likely to apply
6The fact that the data come from only one company should not bias the data too
much, as at the time when the data were extracted, Findomestic Banca was the dominant
player at the instalment credit market in Italy.
17Table 7: Sensitivity Results - 2 and 3 GI Information Only
Variable Marg. E®. (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
New Cars and Motor Homes (1) -0.031y (0.018)
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes (2) -0.014 (0.017)
Motorbikes (3) 0.005 (0.012)
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) (4) 0.013 (0.011)
Computers (5) -0.012 (0.014)
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) (6) 0.000 (0.012)
Furniture Units (7) -0.003 (0.014)
Telecommunication (8) 0.021 (0.015)
GI(1) 0.001 (0.009)
GI(2) 0.000 (0.009)
GI(3) 0.014 (0.009)
GI(4) -0.007 (0.007)
GI(5) -0.011 (0.009)
GI(6) -0.021¤ (0.009)
GI(7) -0.015y (0.009)
GI(8) -0.004 (0.007)
GI(9) -0.011 (0.008)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other (9) is the Base Category.
again for credit than those who do not.7 Therefore, individuals who repaid
their ¯rst loan may be more likely to apply again, and thus have more
information about their goods-type individual heterogeneity revealed in the
data.8 The correlation between the information on individual heterogeneity
and the repayment behavior on the ¯rst loan is not however obvious, as it
is also the variation in the goods applied for to be ¯nanced through credit
that matters. Individuals who (for any reason) tend to buy di®erent types
of goods on credit will also tend to have more of the GI indicators equal to
one. We explore this potential bias with a second sensitivity analysis, where
we use individuals who are observed to have applied only for two or three
7We use all applications for instalment loans (both rejected and accepted) to construct
the goods-type individual heterogeneity indicator, so it is really the probability of multiple
applications rather than multiple accepted contracts that matter here.
8 There is a higher chance that they have more GI indicators equal to one.
18di®erent types of goods.9 The sample size thus reduces to 13,076 accepted
¯rst applications and (again) 16,020 rejected ¯rst applications. Conditioning
on three or four pieces of information leaves us with too few individuals
to render the model estimable under the same speci¯cation. The results
from the sensitivity analysis that conditions on two or three good-types
applications are summarized in Table 7. The results are almost identical to
the results from the previous sensitivity analysis, the only di®erence is that
the selection e®ect of the motorcycles is not even weakly signi¯cant now.
Overall, the sensitivity analysis con¯rms the importance of the selection
versus the good e®ect. It shows that the positive (reducing probability of
default) selection e®ect of kitchen appliances and furniture units and the
negative good e®ect of the new cars are robust across the speci¯cations.
8 Conclusion
The default rates on instalment loans vary with the type of the good pur-
chased on credit. Loans to buy mobile phones and motorcycles have a much
higher risk of not being repaid than loans to buy furniture or kitchen ap-
pliances. The aim of this paper has been to explore whether the observed
variation is due to individuals with di®erent repayment behavior selecting
themselves to buy di®erent types of goods (the selection e®ect) or due to
speci¯c features of the goods' themselves that a®ect the incentive to repay
in di®erent ways (the good e®ect).
The analysis uses data on instalment loans from a major Italian bank,
Findomestic Banca, during the period of 1995-1999 to estimate a model
of the probability of default. Multiple contract observations per individual
allow us to disentangle the selection e®ect from the good e®ect, and identify
which of the two dominates.
We ¯rst show that the unconditional variation in default rates across dif-
ferent goods persists even after conditioning on numerous contract-speci¯c
and individual-speci¯c characteristics in the model of the probability of de-
fault. This remains true even when we take into account the potential
bias from the fact that the repayment behavior is observed only for the
accepted applications. Using bivariate probit model with censoring, we es-
timate the default probability and the acceptance decision jointly, with the
9 We use individuals with both two and three pieces of information on the individual
heterogeneity together, because conditioning on only one of them - e.g. imposing the
sum of the GI coe±cients equal two - introduces perfect multicolinearity to the model. It
follows that one of the GI indicators has to be dropped and the corresponding good-type
individual speci¯c heterogeneity e®ects cannot be estimated.
19good-speci¯c dummy variables present. Usury Law enacted in the middle
of the observed period provides us with the exclusion restriction for the se-
lection equation, describing the acceptance decision by the creditor. The
estimated goods' indicators measure the residual cross-good variation in the
probability of default. They are signi¯cant and sizable, suggesting that the
di®erences in the repayment behavior across goods exist even when control-
ling for the observable characteristics and for the acceptance decision.
To avoid endogenous attrition and the complex selection process of the
subsequent applications, and due to the lack of the exact timing information
on subsequent contracts in the data, we estimate the default probability
using only the accepted ¯rst contracts, and the rejected ¯rst applications to
control for the censoring. However, we use the subsequent applications per
individual to proxy the unobserved individual goods-type heterogeneity in
order to disentangle the selection and the good e®ect.
The preferred model, which includes both the good-speci¯c dummy vari-
ables and the individual goods-types indicators constructed from the multi-
ple contracts observations, reveals that most of the cross-good variation can
be explained by selection. We therefore conclude that it is di®erent types
of people (with di®erent propensity to default) that sort themselves to dif-
ferent types of goods, which drives the observed variation in the repayment
behavior across di®erent types of goods. In particular, the results suggest
that individuals who buy kitchen appliances and furniture units are on av-
erage less likely to default on their loans. We also ¯nd some evidence that
individuals who buy motorcycles are more likely than an average individual
to default on any type of loan.
The purely \causal" good e®ect on the default probability remains only
for new cars and mobile phones. The ¯rst is negative, suggesting that higher
threat of repossession may increase the incentives to repay a new car. On
the other hand, the e®ect of mobile phones is positive - they are less likely
to be repossessed, and are strongly in°uenced by fashion, which increases
their turnover and reduces the borrowers' incentives to repay. However,
sensitivity analysis shows that only the e®ect of the new cars is robust.
The conclusion that the selection e®ect drives the variation in the default
probability, is therefore even more emphasized.
We conclude that conditions of the loan and the acceptance decision
should not depend only on the type of the good being purchased but also
on the good-related type of the individual who applies for the loan. It also
follows that previous applications may be used by credit-granting companies
as an additional information about the propensity to default even without
or prior to observing the repayment behavior on the ¯rst loan.
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21A De¯nition of the Key Variables
interann interest rate (IRR) computed by the author10
good1-good9 type of good indicators
GI1-GI9 goods-type of individual (construction described in the text)
Iprov 2- Iprov 33 indicator of the province of residence
insured indicator whether the contract has been insured
intwho1 indicator that the interest rate is paid by the borrower
intwho3 indicator that the interest rate is paid by the dealer
exp work experience
expsq work experience squared
hown indicator for homeownership
mort indicator for mortgage
Ies 2 public employees
Ies 3 self-employed
Ies 4 retired
Ies 5 others
yd disposable income
ydsq disposable income squared
Nkids number of children
mstat indicator for married
Nmonths length of the contract in months
priceD price of the good purchased
priceDsq price of the good squared
10I am grateful to Stefan Hochguertel for providing me the code to calculate IRRs from
Alessie et al. (2005)
22paybank payments made by bank (vs. postal order)
Iorig 2 - Iorig 4 origin of the contract (dealer who sells the good)
amountD size of the loan
amountDsq size of the loan square
year97-year99 year of the evaluation (dummy variables)
dy2-dy5 indicator of the year of the inception (dummy variables)
Ybank90 tenure with the bank (was a customer before 1990)
Iagency X bank's agency indicator (dummy variables)
pre ref indicator whether contract started before the Usury Law
was enacted or after
B Appendix - Full Estimation Results
This section contains the full estimation results for the three models and
the sensitivity analysis. In the models that use the bivariate probit model
to control for the selection bias due to the fact that only accepted loan
applications are observed, only the default equation and the estimate of the
cross-equation correlation of the error terms are presented. The estimates of
the selection equation (the acceptance decision) are subject to the privacy
restrictions of the data provider. They are available from the author under
strict con¯dentiality conditions.
Table 8: Legend for the Types of Goods
New Cars and Motor Homes Good 1
(Used) Cars and Motor Homes Good 2
Motorbikes Good 3
Electr. Equipment (Brown Goods) Good 4
Computers Good 5
White Goods (Kitchen Appliances) Good 6
Furniture Units Good 7
Telecommunication Good 8
Other Good 9
23Table 9: Model I
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
interann 0.735¤¤ (0.119)
good1 -0.462¤¤ (0.089)
good2 0.021 (0.068)
good3 0.108¤¤ (0.038)
good4 0.185¤¤ (0.034)
good5 0.004 (0.057)
good6 0.012 (0.047)
good7 -0.140¤¤ (0.050)
good8 0.386¤¤ (0.036)
Iprov 2 -0.024 (0.117)
Iprov 3 0.147y (0.081)
Iprov 4 -0.179¤ (0.078)
Iprov 5 0.124 (0.077)
Iprov 6 0.161y (0.085)
Iprov 7 -0.174¤ (0.083)
Iprov 8 -0.048 (0.080)
Iprov 9 -0.025 (0.075)
Iprov 10 0.018 (0.084)
Iprov 11 0.020 (0.083)
Iprov 12 0.153 (0.096)
Iprov 13 -0.023 (0.087)
Iprov 14 -0.115 (0.079)
Iprov 15 -0.039 (0.083)
Iprov 16 0.160¤ (0.076)
Iprov 17 0.026 (0.073)
Iprov 18 0.016 (0.078)
Iprov 19 -0.008 (0.079)
Iprov 20 0.125 (0.094)
Iprov 21 -0.101 (0.085)
Iprov 22 -0.107 (0.088)
Iprov 23 -0.020 (0.099)
Iprov 24 0.069 (0.089)
Iprov 25 0.128 (0.095)
Iprov 26 -0.016 (0.073)
Iprov 27 -0.048 (0.079)
Iprov 28 -0.224¤ (0.107)
Iprov 29 0.094 (0.077)
24Iprov 30 -0.160 (0.105)
Iprov 31 0.049 (0.092)
Iprov 32 0.039 (0.101)
Iprov 33 0.159y (0.084)
insured 0.023¤¤ (0.007)
intwho1 0.102 (0.065)
intwho3 0.114y (0.062)
exp -0.022¤¤ (0.003)
expsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
hown -0.213¤¤ (0.019)
mort -0.321¤¤ (0.057)
Ies 2 -0.051¤ (0.024)
Ies 3 0.364¤¤ (0.025)
Ies 4 0.006 (0.030)
Ies 5 0.008 (0.054)
yd -0.006¤¤ (0.001)
ydsq 0.000 (0.000)
Nkids -0.030¤¤ (0.009)
mstat 0.053¤¤ (0.014)
Nmonths 0.001 (0.002)
priceD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
priceDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
paybank -1.092¤¤ (0.032)
Iorig 2 -0.074 (0.077)
Iorig 3 -0.064y (0.034)
Iorig 4 -0.052y (0.029)
amountD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
amountDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
year97 0.502¤¤ (0.041)
year98 0.972¤¤ (0.049)
year99 1.519¤¤ (0.054)
dy2 -0.258¤¤ (0.039)
dy3 -0.691¤¤ (0.048)
dy4 -1.169¤¤ (0.054)
dy5 -1.641¤¤ (0.061)
Ybank90 -0.084¤¤ (0.028)
Intercept -1.988¤¤ (0.110)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Other (9) is the Base Category.
25Table 10: Model II
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
interann 0.635¤¤ (0.121)
good1 -0.362¤¤ (0.094)
good2 0.046 (0.068)
good3 0.098¤¤ (0.038)
good4 0.167¤¤ (0.034)
good5 0.003 (0.056)
good6 0.000 (0.047)
good7 -0.116¤ (0.050)
good8 0.353¤¤ (0.037)
Iprov 2 -0.060 (0.117)
Iprov 3 0.155y (0.080)
Iprov 4 -0.156¤ (0.078)
Iprov 5 0.124 (0.076)
Iprov 6 0.151y (0.084)
Iprov 7 -0.146y (0.083)
Iprov 8 -0.054 (0.079)
Iprov 9 -0.025 (0.074)
Iprov 10 0.001 (0.083)
Iprov 11 0.007 (0.082)
Iprov 12 0.157y (0.095)
Iprov 13 -0.010 (0.086)
Iprov 14 -0.104 (0.078)
Iprov 15 -0.018 (0.083)
Iprov 16 0.138y (0.076)
Iprov 17 0.007 (0.073)
Iprov 18 0.032 (0.077)
Iprov 19 -0.015 (0.078)
Iprov 20 0.115 (0.093)
Iprov 21 -0.086 (0.084)
Iprov 22 -0.096 (0.087)
Iprov 23 -0.006 (0.098)
Iprov 24 0.059 (0.088)
Iprov 25 0.124 (0.094)
Iprov 26 -0.018 (0.072)
Continued on next page...
26... table 10 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Iprov 27 -0.033 (0.079)
Iprov 28 -0.203y (0.107)
Iprov 29 0.086 (0.076)
Iprov 30 -0.153 (0.104)
Iprov 31 0.058 (0.091)
Iprov 32 0.021 (0.100)
Iprov 33 0.151y (0.083)
insured 0.025¤¤ (0.007)
intwho1 0.087 (0.064)
intwho3 0.091 (0.062)
exp -0.017¤¤ (0.003)
expsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
hown -0.177¤¤ (0.022)
mort -0.290¤¤ (0.058)
Ies 2 -0.036 (0.024)
Ies 3 0.343¤¤ (0.026)
Ies 4 0.002 (0.029)
Ies 5 -0.049 (0.056)
yd -0.006¤¤ (0.001)
ydsq 0.000 (0.000)
Nkids -0.035¤¤ (0.009)
mstat 0.040¤¤ (0.014)
Nmonths -0.003 (0.002)
priceD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
priceDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
paybank -0.986¤¤ (0.042)
Iorig 2 -0.075 (0.077)
Iorig 3 -0.071¤ (0.033)
Iorig 4 -0.084¤¤ (0.030)
amountD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
amountDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
year97 0.507¤¤ (0.041)
year98 0.974¤¤ (0.048)
year99 1.515¤¤ (0.054)
dy2 -0.298¤¤ (0.040)
dy3 -0.742¤¤ (0.049)
dy4 -1.221¤¤ (0.054)
Continued on next page...
27... table 10 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
dy5 -1.697¤¤ (0.061)
Ybank90 -0.082¤¤ (0.028)
Intercept -1.929¤¤ (0.111)
Equation 2 : accept
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept 0.279¤¤ (0.093)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Table 11: Model III - Preferred Model
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
interann 0.630¤¤ (0.121)
good1 -0.515¤¤ (0.129)
good2 -0.104 (0.115)
good3 -0.145y (0.080)
good4 0.134¤ (0.068)
good5 0.023 (0.115)
good6 0.113 (0.091)
good7 -0.059 (0.103)
good8 0.240¤¤ (0.072)
GI1 0.026 (0.074)
GI2 0.019 (0.080)
GI3 0.109¤ (0.052)
GI4 -0.105¤¤ (0.034)
GI5 -0.158y (0.089)
GI6 -0.242¤¤ (0.062)
GI7 -0.190¤ (0.078)
GI8 -0.020 (0.039)
GI9 -0.135¤¤ (0.050)
Iprov 2 -0.062 (0.117)
Iprov 3 0.160¤ (0.080)
Iprov 4 -0.155¤ (0.078)
Continued on next page...
28... table 11 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Iprov 5 0.127y (0.076)
Iprov 6 0.156y (0.084)
Iprov 7 -0.136y (0.083)
Iprov 8 -0.052 (0.079)
Iprov 9 -0.020 (0.074)
Iprov 10 0.001 (0.083)
Iprov 11 0.010 (0.082)
Iprov 12 0.156 (0.095)
Iprov 13 -0.007 (0.086)
Iprov 14 -0.101 (0.078)
Iprov 15 -0.009 (0.083)
Iprov 16 0.138y (0.076)
Iprov 17 0.010 (0.073)
Iprov 18 0.034 (0.077)
Iprov 19 0.003 (0.078)
Iprov 20 0.115 (0.093)
Iprov 21 -0.085 (0.084)
Iprov 22 -0.091 (0.087)
Iprov 23 0.001 (0.099)
Iprov 24 0.065 (0.088)
Iprov 25 0.128 (0.094)
Iprov 26 -0.014 (0.072)
Iprov 27 -0.037 (0.079)
Iprov 28 -0.198y (0.107)
Iprov 29 0.090 (0.076)
Iprov 30 -0.151 (0.104)
Iprov 31 0.052 (0.091)
Iprov 32 0.019 (0.100)
Iprov 33 0.155y (0.083)
insured 0.025¤¤ (0.007)
intwho1 0.085 (0.064)
intwho3 0.088 (0.062)
exp -0.017¤¤ (0.003)
expsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
hown -0.180¤¤ (0.022)
mort -0.292¤¤ (0.058)
Ies 2 -0.033 (0.024)
Continued on next page...
29... table 11 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Ies 3 0.341¤¤ (0.026)
Ies 4 0.002 (0.029)
Ies 5 -0.047 (0.056)
yd -0.006¤¤ (0.001)
ydsq 0.000 (0.000)
Nkids -0.034¤¤ (0.009)
mstat 0.042¤¤ (0.014)
Nmonths -0.003 (0.002)
priceD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
priceDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
paybank -0.985¤¤ (0.042)
Iorig 2 -0.075 (0.077)
Iorig 3 -0.072¤ (0.033)
Iorig 4 -0.090¤¤ (0.030)
amountD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
amountDsq 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
year97 0.507¤¤ (0.041)
year98 0.976¤¤ (0.048)
year99 1.513¤¤ (0.054)
dy2 -0.302¤¤ (0.040)
dy3 -0.751¤¤ (0.049)
dy4 -1.236¤¤ (0.055)
dy5 -1.716¤¤ (0.061)
Ybank90 -0.084¤¤ (0.028)
Intercept -1.768¤¤ (0.122)
Equation 2 : accept
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept 0.282¤¤ (0.094)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Table 12: Sensitivity Results I - Multiple GI Information
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
Continued on next page...
30... table 12 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
interann 0.808¤¤ (0.303)
good1 -0.553y (0.290)
good2 -0.166 (0.209)
good3 0.037 (0.116)
good4 0.125 (0.095)
good5 -0.140 (0.183)
good6 0.003 (0.129)
good7 -0.021 (0.149)
good8 0.201y (0.104)
GI1 0.040 (0.088)
GI2 0.018 (0.092)
GI3 0.140¤ (0.069)
GI4 -0.075 (0.063)
GI5 -0.145 (0.100)
GI6 -0.262¤¤ (0.076)
GI7 -0.187¤ (0.090)
GI8 -0.043 (0.063)
GI9 -0.125y (0.067)
Iprov 2 -0.508 (0.396)
Iprov 3 0.001 (0.182)
Iprov 4 -0.403¤ (0.180)
Iprov 5 -0.029 (0.177)
Iprov 6 0.061 (0.194)
Iprov 7 -0.483¤ (0.192)
Iprov 8 -0.413¤ (0.179)
Iprov 9 -0.222 (0.161)
Iprov 10 -0.186 (0.184)
Iprov 11 -0.077 (0.185)
Iprov 12 -0.162 (0.265)
Iprov 13 -0.388y (0.202)
Iprov 14 -0.180 (0.173)
Iprov 15 -0.194 (0.181)
Iprov 16 -0.089 (0.188)
Iprov 17 -0.154 (0.160)
Iprov 18 -0.092 (0.179)
Iprov 19 -0.350¤ (0.170)
Iprov 20 0.080 (0.245)
Continued on next page...
31... table 12 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Iprov 21 -0.311 (0.207)
Iprov 22 -0.199 (0.200)
Iprov 23 -0.118 (0.217)
Iprov 24 -0.050 (0.188)
Iprov 25 -0.009 (0.232)
Iprov 26 -0.208 (0.161)
Iprov 27 -0.236 (0.181)
Iprov 28 -0.651¤ (0.262)
Iprov 29 -0.060 (0.175)
Iprov 30 -0.364 (0.231)
Iprov 31 -0.265 (0.242)
Iprov 32 -0.140 (0.263)
Iprov 33 0.017 (0.193)
insured 0.004 (0.016)
intwho1 0.072 (0.145)
intwho3 0.010 (0.140)
exp -0.020¤¤ (0.008)
expsq 0.000y (0.000)
hown -0.198¤¤ (0.053)
mort -0.352¤ (0.154)
Ies 2 -0.045 (0.059)
Ies 3 0.314¤¤ (0.064)
Ies 4 0.070 (0.078)
Ies 5 -0.159 (0.148)
yd -0.014¤¤ (0.005)
ydsq 0.000 (0.000)
Nkids -0.032 (0.020)
mstat 0.043 (0.035)
Nmonths -0.003 (0.006)
priceD 0.000¤ (0.000)
priceDsq 0.000 (0.000)
paybank -0.959¤¤ (0.195)
Iorig 2 -0.235 (0.187)
Iorig 3 -0.106 (0.090)
Iorig 4 -0.316¤¤ (0.091)
amountD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
amountDsq 0.000 (0.000)
Continued on next page...
32... table 12 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
year97 0.546¤¤ (0.089)
year98 1.020¤¤ (0.108)
year99 1.531¤¤ (0.126)
dy2 -0.354¤¤ (0.102)
dy3 -0.796¤¤ (0.134)
dy4 -1.168¤¤ (0.169)
dy5 -1.469¤¤ (0.227)
Ybank90 -0.154¤ (0.074)
Intercept -1.376¤¤ (0.270)
Equation 2 : accept
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept -0.010 (0.172)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Table 13: Sensitivity Results II - 2 and 3 GI Information
Only
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : default
interann 0.811¤¤ (0.304)
good1 -0.487y (0.293)
good2 -0.165 (0.213)
good3 0.049 (0.118)
good4 0.134 (0.097)
good5 -0.138 (0.184)
good6 0.004 (0.131)
good7 -0.030 (0.151)
good8 0.206y (0.106)
GI1 0.008 (0.098)
GI2 -0.002 (0.101)
GI3 0.134y (0.077)
GI4 -0.079 (0.071)
GI5 -0.133 (0.107)
GI6 -0.259¤¤ (0.084)
Continued on next page...
33... table 13 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
GI7 -0.179y (0.097)
GI8 -0.043 (0.072)
GI9 -0.129y (0.076)
Iprov 2 -0.516 (0.397)
Iprov 3 -0.001 (0.182)
Iprov 4 -0.408¤ (0.180)
Iprov 5 -0.029 (0.178)
Iprov 6 0.066 (0.194)
Iprov 7 -0.487¤ (0.192)
Iprov 8 -0.416¤ (0.179)
Iprov 9 -0.219 (0.162)
Iprov 10 -0.214 (0.186)
Iprov 11 -0.079 (0.186)
Iprov 12 -0.161 (0.266)
Iprov 13 -0.393y (0.202)
Iprov 14 -0.184 (0.173)
Iprov 15 -0.215 (0.182)
Iprov 16 -0.093 (0.188)
Iprov 17 -0.168 (0.160)
Iprov 18 -0.116 (0.180)
Iprov 19 -0.349¤ (0.170)
Iprov 20 0.073 (0.245)
Iprov 21 -0.370y (0.211)
Iprov 22 -0.223 (0.202)
Iprov 23 -0.145 (0.220)
Iprov 24 -0.044 (0.188)
Iprov 25 -0.039 (0.237)
Iprov 26 -0.211 (0.161)
Iprov 27 -0.235 (0.181)
Iprov 28 -0.650¤ (0.263)
Iprov 29 -0.063 (0.176)
Iprov 30 -0.356 (0.231)
Iprov 31 -0.264 (0.243)
Iprov 32 -0.132 (0.264)
Iprov 33 0.018 (0.194)
insured 0.003 (0.017)
intwho1 0.060 (0.146)
Continued on next page...
34... table 13 continued
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
intwho3 -0.002 (0.141)
exp -0.021¤¤ (0.008)
expsq 0.000y (0.000)
hown -0.191¤¤ (0.054)
mort -0.344¤ (0.154)
Ies 2 -0.048 (0.060)
Ies 3 0.313¤¤ (0.064)
Ies 4 0.061 (0.078)
Ies 5 -0.159 (0.149)
yd -0.015¤¤ (0.005)
ydsq 0.000 (0.000)
Nkids -0.032 (0.020)
mstat 0.044 (0.035)
Nmonths -0.003 (0.006)
priceD 0.000¤ (0.000)
priceDsq 0.000 (0.000)
paybank -0.954¤¤ (0.197)
Iorig 2 -0.268 (0.193)
Iorig 3 -0.100 (0.090)
Iorig 4 -0.313¤¤ (0.092)
amountD 0.000¤¤ (0.000)
amountDsq 0.000 (0.000)
year97 0.539¤¤ (0.090)
year98 1.004¤¤ (0.109)
year99 1.515¤¤ (0.127)
dy2 -0.359¤¤ (0.103)
dy3 -0.802¤¤ (0.134)
dy4 -1.173¤¤ (0.170)
dy5 -1.473¤¤ (0.227)
Ybank90 -0.164¤ (0.075)
Intercept -1.339¤¤ (0.280)
Equation 2 : accept
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept -0.009 (0.174)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
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